This paper examines the long-term effects of extended unemployment benefits that older unemployed can collect until retirement in Finland. We consider a reform that increased the age threshold of this scheme from 55 to 57 for people born in 1950 or later. Our regression discontinuity estimates show that postponing eligibility by two years increased employment over the remaining working career by seven months. Despite the corresponding reduction in unemployment, we find no evidence of significant effects on mortality or receipt of disability and sickness benefits, nor on the spouse's labor supply. We also compute the fiscal impact of the reform taking into account income taxes and social security contributions paid and benefits received. The reform increased net income transfers by 15,000 Euros over the 10-year period for an average individual.
Introduction
In many European countries, longer entitlement periods of unemployment insurance (UI) benets are provided for older unemployed. These benet extensions can contribute to high levels of unemployment in the oldest groups in two ways. First, employers tend to target dismissals at those employees who qualify for extended benets. Some eligible workers may also leave their job voluntarily to obtain more leisure time if the benet scheme is suciently generous. As a result, the oldest workers eligible for extended benets are found to enter unemployment at a high rate (Winter-Ebmer, 2003 , Kyyrä and Wilke, 2007 , Tuit and van Ours, 2010 , and Baguelin and Remillon, 2014 . Second, among unemployed workers eligibility for extended benets discourages job search and thereby prolongs unemployment spells, and such benets are often used to bridge the time until retirement (Hunt, 1995 , Lalive and Zweimüller, 2004 , Kyyrä and Ollikainen, 2008 , Lalive, 2008 , Tatsiramos, 2010 , Baguelin and Remillon, 2014 , and Inderbitzin et al., 2016 . While the eects of extended benets on the unemployment inow and the duration of unemployment spells are well documented, their long-term eects, scal impact and eects on health and spouse's behavior have been studied less.
In this paper, we study a reform in 2005 that postponed access to extended UI benets by two years from age 55 to 57 in Finland. The Finnish scheme is rather generous in the sense that the extended benets can be received until retirement. We nd that the twoyear increase in the eligibility age increased employment by 7 months between the ages of 54 and 63 among private-sector workers. Despite a large reduction in the time spent in unemployment, we nd no evidence of health eects as measured by the amount of disability and sickness benets received, and mortality by the end of 2015. Moreover, the spouse's employment months and retirement age do not appear to be aected. As such, the only eect seems to be higher employment for the group that was directly aected by the reform. This employment eect amounts to an increase of 22,000 Euros in wage income and a decrease of 11,000 Euros in unemployment-related benets on average over the 10-year period. Higher earnings also reduce the need to rely on other benets, such as housing allowance and social assistance, while increasing taxes and social security contributions paid to the society. Taking all benets, income taxes and social security contributions into account we estimate that the scal impact of the reform was around 15,000 Euros over the 10-year period for an average individual. This is a large eect given that the counterfactual level of average net transfers over the same period is about 26,000
Euros.
We reach these conclusions using a sharp regression discontinuity design (RDD) and rich register data on all private-sector employees born in 1949 and 1950 setting for RDD analysis given that the individuals cannot manipulate their eligibility status which is based on the birth date. We also show that the individuals on both sides of the cuto are highly similar in observable characteristics, and therefore it is likely that they do not dier signicantly in terms of unobservables either. Despite this homogeneity, those born in 1950 worked on average notably more than those born in 1949 over the 10-year period. The jump of 7 months at the cuto value is quite large in relation to the only two-year dierence in the minimum eligibility age for extended benets. This implies that the extended benet scheme as a whole must have a large negative impact on employment of the oldest worker groups.
Our results are in line with previous research showing that the risk of job loss is higher for workers who can qualify for extended benets and that those unemployed who are entitled to extended benets experience much longer unemployment spells.
1 Our ndings complement the existing studies by providing evidence of the full impact of these employment eects in the form of changes in employment months and wages over the remaining working career. We also provide evidence of the extent to which various income transfers counteract the wage losses. The previous literature has not been able to assess 1 In the Finnish context, Kyyrä and Wilke (2007) show that the unemployment risk of private-sector workers at least doubles at the minimum eligibility age, and Kyyrä and Ollikainen (2008) estimate that approximately one half of unemployed workers eligible for the benet extension withdraw from job search entirely.
scal impacts at such a detailed level. In addition, we contribute to the literature by examining broader impacts of extended benets in terms of health, program substitution and spouse's labor supply.
Some previous studies have found a positive association between unemployment and mortality (e.g. Sullivan and von Wachter, 2009, and Eliason and Storrie, 2009 ), but to the best of our knowledge the eects on older unemployed with access to extended benets have not been studied. Since extended benets essentially secure the income for an unemployed person until retirement and extended benets can be regarded as an early retirement scheme, it may be that many of the negative eects of unemployment on an individual's health may be absent. This could explain why we nd no change in mortality despite the large drop in unemployment months.
Unlike some other studies (e.g. Inderbitzin et al., 2016) , we nd that eligibility for extended UI benets has no eect on receipt of sickness and disability benets. Furthermore, although several studies have found that the labor supply decisions of older couples are interrelated (e.g. Blau, 1998 , Michaud, 2003 , Zweimuller et al., 1996 , and Lalive and Parrotta, 2016 , we nd no eect on spouse's behavior even though the extended benets act as a pathway to early retirement for many unemployed workers. It could be that the involuntary nature of unemployment for most aected workers causes dierences compared to the setting in which both spouses' decisions concern regular retirement.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.
In the next section we describe the unemployment-related benets for older workers in Finland. Section 3 presents our research design and section 4 describes our data. Section 5 reports our estimation results and in section 6 we discuss the robustness of these results. The nal section concludes.
Institutional setting
In Finland, UI benets are paid by unemployment funds. Membership is voluntary, but as many as 90% of all workers are enrolled in unemployment funds. The benet level is determined by the average earnings over the past 34 weeks of employment. Unlike in most other countries, there is no cap in the benet level, but the replacement rate declines rapidly with the past earnings. Those who are not eligible for UI benets may qualify for a at-rate labor market subsidy paid by the Social Insurance Institution. This benet is means-tested but available indenitely for the needy.
During our observation period, unemployment fund members with sucient work history who lost their job were entitled to 100 weeks of UI benets provided that they had registered as an unemployed job seeker at the public employment service. However, older unemployed constitute an exception as those above a certain age threshold on the day when their regular benets expire (and who have been working for at least 5 years in the past 20 years) qualify for extended benets which can be received until retirement.
The age threshold for the benet extension has been raised gradually over time. It was increased from 55 to 57 in 1997 for all workers, from 57 to 59 years in 2005 for those born in or after 1950, from 59 to 60 in 2010 for those born in or after 1955, and from 60 to the current 61 in 2014 for those born in or after 1957.
In addition, long-term unemployed individuals born before 1950 were entitled to an unemployment pension between the ages of 60 and 64, which was then followed by conventional old-age pension at the age of 65. The unemployment pension was abolished in 2005 but only from later cohorts. The combination of regular and extended UI benets (and unemployment pension for those born before 1950) is known as the unemployment tunnel (UT) scheme. The changes in eligibility for this scheme over time by cohort and age are illustrated in gure 2.
In this study, we focus solely on workers born in 1949 and 1950, of whom those born in the latter year were aected by the 2005 reform. Unemployed workers born in 1949 who reached the age of 57 before running out of their regular benets were allowed to collect extended benets until the age of 60, after which they could claim unemployment pension. This means that a newly unemployed individual had to be at least 55 years and 1 month of age when becoming unemployed to be eligible for the UT scheme. As a consequence of the 2005 reform, the individuals born in 1950 had to be at least 57 and 1 month at the time of unemployment entry in order to be able to receive UI benets until old-age pension. These individuals could move freely into old-age pension between the ages of 62 and 65. The two-year increase in the age threshold was the major change in the 2005 reform, albeit two other changes may have played some role as well.
First, as pointed out above, the unemployment pension was abolished and replaced by additional weeks of extended UI benets for the individuals born in 1950 or later.
The compensation level of unemployment pension was determined by previous earnings but over a longer period than that used for determining the UI benet. As a result, the unemployment pension could be either higher or lower than the preceding UI benet depending on the individual's earnings prole. In most cases, the levels of these benets were close to each other but the unemployment pension was on average somewhat higher than the UI benet. The UT scheme thus provided a slightly lower average benet level 2 The cost of extended benets is calculated assuming the worker will collect them until age 63 (the minimum old-age retirement age since 2005) irrespective of the actual behavior. In the case of a worker who qualies for an old-age pension before the regular benets expire, the former employer is liable for a share of the costs of regular benets actually paid to the worker.
3 Hakola and Uusitalo (2005) analyze a reform that changed the premium rates in 2000 and nd that the experience rating of the unemployment pension costs reduced early exits from work among older workers. Lee and Lemieux, 2010) . In particular, we estimate nonparametric local linear models of the form We report results both with and without control variables.
To implement the RDD approach we need to choose the kernel function for weighting the observations and the bandwidth to determine the sample size around the cuto. The choice of the kernel function makes little dierence in practice. We use the triangular kernel that is widely used in applied work. Calonico et al. (2014) argue that commonly used bandwidth selectors tend to yield bandwidths that are too large to ensure the validity of the underlying distributional approximations, potentially leading to non-negligible bias. They propose an alternative method where the RDD point estimate is corrected by an estimated bias term, and the standard error estimates are adjusted for additional variability that results from the estimation of the bias correction term. We report both the conventional and bias-corrected point estimates. We select the bandwidth such that the point estimator for the bias-corrected estimate is mean square error (MSE) optimal using a procedure developed by Calonico et al. (2016) . We also study the sensitivity of our results to the chosen bandwidth and polynomial order. The FLEED also includes an identier for each individual's spouse, which we use to link spouse's records from the above registers to the individuals in our sample.
This enables us
to analyze spillover eects on spouse's behavior and overall eects at the household level.
We consider two measures of spouse's labor supply: the retirement age and months worked in the years 2004 to 2013. For couples we compute household earned income by taking the sum of both spouses' earned income (i.e. all taxable income except capital income).
This measure ignores the earned income of children and other people possibly living in the same household. In addition, we consider household disposable income which captures the role of the tax and income transfer system. Unlike the household earned income, this measure includes the incomes of all individuals living in the same household.
We limit our analysis to individuals born in 1949 or 1950 who worked in the private sector in 2001, that is, 3 or 5 years prior to eligibility to the UT scheme. This sample includes 62% of both cohorts. The unemployment risk in the public sector was very low for these cohorts and the UT scheme is mainly used by large private-sector rms when downsizing. We also run our main analyses using data on workers employed in the public sector in 2001, but did not nd evidence of statistically signicant eects of the 2005 reform for them. We do not report these results but they are available on request. earnings and other outcomes are almost identical for the two cohorts. In order to assess this more rigorously we also show RDD estimates for the jump at the beginning of 1950 using a six months bandwidth. The point estimates for the discontinuity are all statistically insignicant for the afore mentioned characteristics. Since large rms in particular use the UT scheme as a soft way to get rid o workers when they downsize (Kyyrä and Wilke, 2007) , we also examine the share of individuals working in rms with over 250
employees. This share appears to be almost the same for the two cohorts and no jump is detected.
A nice feature of our research design is that we can examine outcomes prior to the reform in order to check whether other discontinuities at the birth date threshold could cause discontinuities in the outcomes, although we are not aware of any other reform aecting only one of the two cohorts. Panel B of table 1 displays means for our outcome variables in 2003, when neither cohort was eligible for the UT scheme. These sample means are remarkably similar across the cohorts. Earned income, which is basically all taxable income except capital income, as well as annual wages have similar means in the two cohorts and the RDD estimates indicate no discontinuity at the threshold. The same is true for dierent types of benets. We also consider net transfers, i.e. the dierence housing allowance and social assistance. The means of net transfers are similar in the two cohorts and no discontinuity is detected at the threshold.
Previous research for other countries has shown that educational attainment and, consequently, labor market outcomes can be aected by season of birth through compulsory schooling laws or relative age eects (e.g. Angrist and Krueger, 1991, and Plug, 2001 ).
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This is a cause of concern because our analysis relies on comparing individuals born at the very end of 1949 to individuals born early in 1950. However, the lack of signicant discontinuities in educational level (panel A) and pre-reform outcomes (panel B) should mitigate such concerns.
As we will also study spouses' outcomes, table 1 also shows the age of the spouse in the subsample of the couples is statistically signicant at the conventional risk levels. We will return to these dierences in the next section where we discuss them at length. Table 2 shows characteristics and outcomes for individuals in each cohort conditional on whether they experienced any unemployment during the years 2004 to 2013. In both cohorts 49% of the individuals experienced at least one spell of unemployment during the 10-year period. The key dierence is that job losers in the 1949 cohort remained unemployed for about one year longer than those born in 1950 (39 vs. 27 months). These 5 Kaila (2017) studies short-term eects of the relative school starting age in Finland and nds that those who are born early in the calendar year and therefore start school at a relatively older age are more likely to be admitted to and graduate from academic track high school. individuals who ended up in unemployment at some point and those who did not are highly similar for the two cohorts. This suggests that the selection process into unemployment is similar except that those born in 1949 became unemployed at younger ages. The higher share of manufacturing employees among those with at least one unemployment spell is related to the more extensive use of the UT scheme in the large manufacturing rms. In both cohorts the share deceased is slightly smaller for those with unemployment experiences, which is a somewhat unexpected observation. We examine the long-run eects of the 2005 reform graphically in gure 5 and report the RDD estimates for the same outcomes in table 3. Figure 5a shows the total amount of months employed during the 10-year period from 2004 to 2013. As would be expected 3 imply that the two-year increase in the age limit for extended benets leads to those born in early 1950 working approximately 7 months (9%) more during the 10-year period. These estimates are robust to the inclusion of covariates. In line with the increase in months employed the reform also increases total wages over the 10-year period by about 9% (gure 5b and column 2 of table 3).
Results

Individual outcomes
Correspondingly, those born after the cuto spend over 8 months less time unemployed (gure 5c and column 3 of table 3), which implies 40% lower receipts of unemploymentrelated benets (gure 5d and column 4 of table 3).
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The dierence in total earned income at the cuto is less clear in gure 5e but the estimates in column 5 of table 3 are signicant and imply that the reform led to an increase of just under 4% in earned income over the 10-year period. As earned income includes both labor income and unemployment benets, the opposite eects of the reform on these two outcomes counteract each other and lead to a more subdued eect on earned income.
The UT scheme acts as an early retirement scheme for many unemployed in the sense that only a small share of job losers entitled to extended benets return to employment before old-age pension. One concern is that the scheme is a close substitute for other early retirement options, mainly for disability benets that are payable to all working age individuals with a diagnosed disability.
7 If this is the case, restrictions in the access to the UT scheme can increase the disability inow, mitigating the employment eect of such changes. Another possibility is, of course, that those not entitled to extended benets end up taking more sick leave. Uusitalo and Nivalainen (2013) and Kyyrä (2015) do not nd evidence that the past increases in the age threshold would have had notable spillover eects on the inow to disability benets in Finland. Our analysis is consistent with these previous ndings given that the point estimates for the eects on combined sickness and disability benets are small and not statistically signicant in column 6 of table 3.
As our data include comprehensive information on income taxes and social security contributions paid and all benets received, we are able to assess how the increases in employment caused by the reform aect the net amount that individuals contribute to public nances.
8 Figure 5g and column 7 of table 3 indicate that raising the eligibility 6 The cumulative unemployment benets displayed here also include unemployment pension. 7 Inderbitzin et al. (2016) study the interaction between extended UI benets and take-up of disability benets and retirement benets in Austria. They nd program complementarity (i.e. increased take-up of UI followed by higher disability or retirement benets) for one age group and program substitution (i.e. higher take-up of UI but lower take-up of disability insurance) for older age groups. Lammers et al. (2013) nd evidence of a higher outow to sickness and disability insurance schemes following stricter search requirements for older unemployed in the Netherlands. Previous research has linked unemployment to increases in mortality (e.g. Sullivan and von Wachter, 2009, and Eliason and Storrie, 2009) . To the extent that eligibility to extended benets implies an increase in the incidence and length of unemployment, this could also have implications in terms of mortality. In the case of unemployed workers with access to extended benets, the psychological and nancial stress of unemployment may, however, be somewhat lower than for those not entitled to these benets in earlier stages of working life. Furthermore, it is possible that some of the workers eligible for the UT scheme leave employment voluntarily through this scheme, i.e. the layo decision may be based on a mutual agreement with the employer. Figure 5h and column 8 of table 3 indicate no signicant eect of the 2005 reform on mortality, with the share deceased by 2015 displaying no statistically signicant discontinuity at the cuto. As potential other outcomes aected by the reform we also examined the probability that an individual migrates within the country or emigrates but the eects on these outcomes are not statistically signicant (results not shown, available on request).
These ndings conrm the observations in previous studies that those entitled to extended benets are more likely to become unemployed and less likely to subsequently return to employment. The full impact of the two-year increase of the age limit for extended benets on labor market outcomes is manifested in the substantially higher amounts of employment months and wages for those subject to the higher age limit.
The fact that earned income is aected to a much lesser extent implies that the social transfer system compensates substantially for lower employment in the group who become entitled to extended benets at a younger age. This can also be seen in the dierence in net transfers over the 10-year period.
Spouse and household outcomes
Some studies, such as Blau (1998), Zweimuller et al. (1996) , Michaud (2003) , and Lalive and Parrotta (2016) , indicate that couples' retirement decisions may depend on each other. It may be the case that when an individual becomes unemployed and is entitled to extended benets and unemployment pension, this aects the labor supply of the spouse.
Yet it is not clear, in which direction the eect would go. On the one hand, the decision may be associated with shared tastes for leisure and the spouse is more inclined to reduce 9 On the other hand, nancial concerns may induce the spouse to maintain or increase his or her labor supply when the partner is unemployed. For the older unemployed nding a new job can be particularly dicult and hence the risk of long-term unemployment would be high even in the absence of disincentive eects due to the extended benet period. Figure 6 and table 4 analyze outcomes for the spouses of our sample members and outcomes at the household level. The spouse's average retirement age in gure 6a shows no clear pattern and the estimates in column 1 of table 4 indicate that there is no statistically signicant discontinuity at the cuto. In line with this nding, the spouse's months employed do not appear to be aected by the increase in the age limit of extended benets (gure 6b and column 2 of table 4). The household earned income in gure 6c shows a slight jump at the cuto as would be expected from the estimates for the earned income of our target population, but the eect is muted by the earnings of the spouse and the point estimates for the discontinuity in column 3 of table 4 are not statistically signicant. Yet the size of the eect is very close to the eect on the individual's earned income in column 5 of table 3, even though the estimates are obtained from somewhat dierent samples.
Our data also enable us to examine household disposable income, which is total household income net of all transfer payments. This measure therefore includes all income of the members of the household and all transfers that are determined at the household level, like housing allowance and social assistance. As such, it provides a measure of the full nancial impact of the reform at the household level when taking into consideration all transfers received and paid. There is a slight discontinuity in household disposable income at the threshold, with households with a family member born in early 1950 displaying slightly higher disposable income than households of the 1949 cohort in gure 6d. However, the point estimates for the eect are not statistically signicant in column 4 of table 4. It should be noted that the analysis of household outcomes only includes those who are observed with the same spouse during our whole observation period. This obviously reduces the sample and therefore statistical power.
We also considered as an outcome the probability that the spouse changes or is missing between 2004 and 2013 for those who had a spouse in 2003. This probability does not appear to be aected by the increase in the age limit of extended benets and subsequent decrease in the incidence and length of unemployment (results not shown, available on request).
It is possible that there are gender dierences in how extended benets as an early retirement scheme aect the labor supply of the spouse. In addition, the relative age of the spouse can inuence the extent to which the spouse can and will adjust his or her labor supply. We have examined these possibilities by running the spouse and household level analyses presented above separately for men and women as well as separately for couples where the spouse is younger/older than the individual in our analysis sample.
The relative age of the spouse does not appear to aect the results and also in the case of gender the results remain largely unchanged. There is a decrease in the retirement age at the cuto for female spouses, but the eect is not statistically signicant and does not show up in the spouse's cumulative months employed. The eect of the two-year increase in the age limit for extended benets has a positive and signicant eect on household disposable income when the aected individual is male (results not shown, available on request). This can be related to men's higher wages and to the fact that the use of extended benets as a soft way of downsizing is prevalent in male dominated occupations in the manufacturing sector. Calonico et al. (2014) and Calonico et al. (2016) . Polynomial order for bias correction is quadratic. Covariates include indicators for gender, for having a university degree, for living in major city and for being employed by a large rm in 2001. Bandwidths are mean square error optimal for the bias-corrected estimator and symmetric on both sides of the cuto. Mean of the dependent variable is for individuals born in the last quarter of 1949. Robust standard errors reported for bias-corrected estimates. Signicance levels: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%.
Robustness
In order to examine the robustness of the results presented in the previous section, we perform a number of sensitivity analyses. mortality is stable around zero for all but the very narrowest bandwidths. Figure 8 shows the sensitivity of the estimates for spouse and household outcomes to varying the bandwidth used in estimation. The point estimate of the eect on the retirement age of the spouse is negative for all bandwidths, and it is statistically signicant at the 5% risk level for a small interval of the bandwidths around 16 weeks. By contrast, the eect on spouse's months employed is stable around zero for the whole range of bandwidths, strengthening the view that the labor supply of the spouse is not aected.
The household earned income and disposable income do not dier statistically signicantly from zero at any bandwidth. It should be kept in mind that the sample used for analysing spouses' outcomes is smaller than our base sample because we only include those who are observed with the same spouse during our whole observation period. This obviously reduces statistical power somewhat.
We further analyze the validity of our research design by examining whether there are discontinuities at placebo cutos. Figure 9 shows the estimated discontinuities at cutos every week for 12 months before and 12 months after the actual threshold at January 1, 1950. The results are from local linear estimations including covariates and using the MSE optimal bandwidth proposed by Calonico et al. (2016) . The results provide evidence in support of our main results, as there are hardly any discontinuities of similar magnitude at placebo cuto points for months employed, wages, months unemployed, unemployment benets and net transfers. The eect at the true cuto for the earned income in the years 20042013 is also larger than at most placebo cutos, but not as clearly discernible. As would be expected from our main results, for sickness and disability benets as well as for the share deceased the eects at the true cuto are indistinguishable from those at alternative cutos. Considering our imprecise results from the main analysis for these outcomes, it is unsurprising that the eects at the true cuto are not discernible in these graphs but similar sized discontinuities are found at various thresholds from January 1949 to December 1950.
In addition to alternative bandwidths and placebo cutos we have also considered the sensitivity of our results to the polynomial order of our specication. We estimated models both with and without additional controls using a quadratic specication for the point estimate and a cubic specication for the bias correction term. These results are very close to those from our linear specication (results not shown, available on request).
Conclusions
This paper presents evidence that the age at which the individual becomes eligible for extended unemployment benets has a substantial impact on labor market outcomes over the last years of the working career. We nd that a two-year increase in the age limit for extended benets increases total months in employment over a 10-year period by 7 months (9%) and wage income by about 22,000 Euros (9%). The corresponding decrease in unemployment-related benets leads to a smaller eect on total earned income which increases by 13,000 Euros (4%). The spouse's labor force participation does not appear to be aected and the eects on household disposable income are subdued. Our results indicate that higher levels of unemployment at older ages do not aect mortality during our observation period. Disability and sickness benets do not appear to be aected either, which is in line with previous Finnish studies and indicates that spillover eects into these benet types may not be a major concern.
Since our data include information on all transfers that individuals residing in Finland have received and paid, we can perform a back of the envelope analysis of the total scal impact of the reform. The improved labor market outcomes caused by the increase in the age limit of extended benets led to an increase of 15,000 Euros (60%) on average in net transfers paid during our 10-year observation period. Considering the cohort size of 33,000 individuals employed in the private sector at the beginning of the period, this implies that the total scal impact of increasing the age limit of extended benets by two years was an increase of up to 500 million Euros in net payments to the society during the 10-year period for a single birth cohort. Taking into account the fact that the reform aected all subsequent cohorts, this can be viewed as a substantial impact on public nances.
